UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

 

 

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

 

                                             Complainant,

 

                         v.

OSHRC DOCKET NO. 12847

DANCO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

 

                                              Respondent.

 

 

October 25, 1977

DECISION

Before: CLEARY, Chairman; and BARNAKO, Commissioner:

CLEARY, Chairman:

            Judge Kennedy’s decision is before us upon an order for review issued under 29 U.S.C. § 661(i). The Judge held that respondent Danco Construction Company failed to maintain a minimum clearance of 10 feet between electrical distribution lines and the boom of a crane unloading pipe and that this was a serious violation of 29 CFR § 1926.550(a)(15)(i).[1]

            While unloading pipe measuring about 24 inches in diameter and 20 feet in length from a flat bed truck and stacking it along side the road beneath the electrical lines, two employees were injured, one fatally, when the boom of the crane came close to the power line. The Judge’s decision contains a full statement of the facts. Respondent employer argued before the Judge that the accident and the movement too close to the power line resulted from the unforeseen carelessness of one employee directing the crane. The Administrative Law Judge held among other things that respondent’s training and supervision of the unloading crew was inadequate and it was therefore not unforeseeable that employees would suffer death or serious physical harm.

            In its brief before us, respondent argues that as an employer it should not be held to be an absolute insurer of the safety of employees and that its supervision of the employees in this instance was adequate.

            The Secretary has filed no brief with us.

            Judge Kennedy did not hold that respondent was an absolute insurer, nor do we. The case turns on whether respondent has proved an affirmative defense of ‘unpreventable employee misconduct.’ See e.g., Leo J. Martone & Associates, Inc., 77 OSAHRC 46/C4, 5 BNA OSHC 1228, 1977 78 CCH OSHD para. 21,718 (No. 11175, 1977); The Kansas Power & Light Co., 77 OSAHRC 39/A2, 5 BNA OSHC 1202, 1977 78 CCH OSHD para. 21,696 (No. 11015, 1977); Utilities Line Construction Co., 76 OSAHRC 121/A2, 4 BNA OSHC 1681, 1976 77 CCH OSHD para. 21,098 (No. 4105, 1976).

            Respondent relies heavily upon the testimony of Mr. Wright, its president, which describes the safety measures taken by the company by way of instructions and safety meetings; that of Mr. Stephen de Linde to the effect that he had received safety instructions; and that of the crane operator Mr. Gonzales, who had been cautioned just about every time he got on the machine to be ‘careful.’ Mr. Francis, respondent’s supervisor, also testified that he cautioned equipment operators to be careful of power lines.

            Respondent has not proved by preponderating evidence that it had adequate training and supervision. The supervisor was not present during the unloading operation. The evidence of instruction to employees on the ground, that is to the two employees who were injured, it very general. There is no evidence of any specific instructions. This is important because the crane operator was largely dependent upon signals from the employees on the ground on whether to raise or lower the boom. It is also significant that the two employees on the ground were young. Billy Rogers was ‘barely old enough to work,’ presumably 18 years of age. Ernest Prince’s age is not indicated, but Mr. Francis, the supervisor, referred to both Roger and Prince as the ‘two boys’ on the ground unloading pipe.

            The absence of effective safety supervision is also suggested by the fact that in operating the crane Mr. Gonzales was allowed to work facing east toward a bright morning sun when in his own words, he ‘couldn’t see much’ (Tr. 178). Given the proximity of the power lines along with the lack of evidence of adequate instructions having been issued to Rogers and Prince and the light conditions in which Gonzales was working, we cannot conclude reasonably that the violation of the standard was unpreventable.

            The Judge’s decision is AFFIRMED.

 

FOR THE COMMISSION

 

William S. McLaughlin

Executive Secretary

DATED: OCT 25, 1977


 


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

 

 

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

 

                                             Complainant,

 

                         v.

OSHRC DOCKET NO. 12847

DANCO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

 

                                              Respondent.

 

 

January 13, 1976

DECISION AND ORDER

Appearances:

Arnold S. Battise, Esq., of Dallas, Texas, for the Secretary

 

John B. Thurman, Esq., and John B. Bingham, Esq., of Little Rock, Arkansas, for the Respondent

 

Harold A. Kennedy, Judge:

            On February 26, 1975, two of Respondent’s employees were injured, one fatally, while unloading and stacking pipe on a North Little Rock, Arkansas, street. A crane was being used to unload the pipe from a flatbed truck. The two injured men were standing on the ground, holding each end of a pipe, guiding it onto a rack. The two men were injured when the boom of the crane came too close to a power line.

            Between February 28 and March 12, 1975, a representative of the Secretary of Labor conducted an investigation of the accident, and on March 17, 1975, a citation issued charging Respondent with ‘serious’[2] violation of Section 5(a)(2) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 by failing to comply with the standard set forth at 29 CFR 1926.550(a)(15)(i).[3] A penalty of $650 was proposed by the Secretary for the alleged violation.

            The citation, designated Citation No. 1, alleged the violation in this language:

A minimum clearance of ten (10) feet was not maintained between electrical distribution lines, rated less than 50 KV, and a part of the crane; i.e. RT 58 Grove 15 ton crane unloading pipe in the vicinity of Military Drive and Texas Street, North Little Rock, Arkansas, February 26, 1975.

 

            The cited standard provides:

Except where electrical distribution and transmission lines have been deenergized and visibly grounded at point of work or where insulating barriers, not a part of or an attachment to the equipment or machinery, have been erected to prevent physical contact with the lines, equipment or machines shall be operated proximate to power lines only in accordance with the following:

(i) For lines rated 50 kV. or below, minimum clearance between the lines and any part of the crane or load shall be 10 feet * * *

 

Respondent timely contested the citation. After pleadings were filed, the case came on for hearing in Little Rock, Arkansas, on August 21, 1975. No one appeared on behalf of Respondent’s employees.[4] The Secretary called five witnesses: William Fay Wright, Respondent’s President; James W. Males, the ‘OSHA’ compliance officer who investigated the accident for the Secretary; Edward P. Fitzgerald, Safety Manager of the Arkansas Power & Light Co.; Earl H. Moreland, Jr., the Chief Engineer of the North Little Rock Electric Department; and Steven de Linde, an employee of Respondent. For its defense, Respondent called Pedro Gonzales, the crane operator, and Wilson M. Frances, Respondent’s Construction Superintendent.

            Jurisdiction is not disputed (Tr. 9). The complainant alleges Respondent is a corporation engaged in construction activity and a business affecting commerce within the meaning of section 3 (5) of the Act. It also avers that it has an office at 1300 East 13th Street in North Little Rock, Arkansas. Respondent’s answer specifically admits these allegations and the averment that asserts jurisdiction is conferred by section 10(c) of the Act.

            The record indicates that Respondent’s business involves the laying of underground utilities (Tr. 109–10, 196, 212). Respondent maintains only the one permanent office in Arkansas but performs work outside of the State. The number of employees varies, ranging as high as 170, but at the time of the inspection Respondent employed approximately 80 persons. Respondent grosses approximately $2.5 million annually. See Tr. 14, 29.

            As noted at the outset, the accident giving rise to the Secretary’s charge occurred on February 26, 1975, when Respondent was engaged in a ‘pipe stringing operation . . . preparatory to laying of . . . pipe (Tr. 21) along the east side of Military Drive near the Camp Robinson military facility (Tr. 64–5, 145, 155–6, 212–13). Complainant’s Exhibits 8, 11, 12, 13, and 14 depict the scene of the accident (Tr. 66–8, 77–81, 84–5, 113). The stringing operation involved unloading of pieces of pipe measuring approximately 24 inches in diameter and 20 feet in length (Tr. 112) from a flatbed truck and stacking it alongside the road beneath electrical and communication (telephone or television cables) lines. A power crane equipped with a cable and hook was used to pick up the pipe and swing it in an easterly direction to a point where it would be stacked in tiers of three, three pipes being placed in each tier. A four by four timber, referred to as a ‘skid’ (Tr. 198), was placed on the ground beneath the first tier. Four by fours were also placed beneath the second and third tiers of pipe. Complainant’s Exhibits 6 and 7 show the method used in stacking the pipe.

            The crane was parked partly off the road on the grass slightly to the rear of the truck. Outriggers were in place to anchor the crane (Tr. 85, 107–9, 117–18, 156).   

            The communication and electrical lines ran parallel to Military Drive at a distance of 20 or 25 feet to the east (Tr. 85–7). Complainant’s Exhibit 9 shows the position and number of the lines as they were attached to the pole closest to the accident scene or to one of its two cross-arms. The lowest wire was estimated to be 19 or 20 feet above the ground, and the highest wire was measured to be at a height of 31 feet. The lowest two wires were identified as communication lines. The ‘middle layer of lines,’ attached to the pole and five feet or more above the communication wires (Tr. 127, 132), carried 120 volts to the ground (220 ‘to the hot wires,’ Tr. 127), sometimes referred to as ‘secondary’ or ‘house current’ distribution. The lines on the top, owned by Arkansas Power and Light, provided service to nearby Camp Robinson and carried 7620/13200. There was also a high voltage line attached to the end of the lower cross-arm, which was owned by the City of North Little Rock and carried essentially the same current—7620 to the ground, 13200 ‘face to face’ between the wires. None of the lines carried over 50,000 volts (50 kV). See Tr. 47, 68–9, 101–7, 118–19; 127–30, 132–33, 142–45.

            Four persons were at the immediate scene when the accident occurred at approximately 10 A.M. on February 26 (Tr. 153).[5] Pedro Gonzales operated the crane. Steve de Linde stood on the flatbed truck for the purpose of attaching the crane cable hook to each piece of pipe so it could be unloaded. Billy Rogers held onto one end of the pipe to guide it onto a rack, and Ernest Prince held onto the other end for the same purpose.

            The evidence indicates that the accident occurred as the second or middle pipe was being placed on the third tier. Only one additional pipe remained to be placed on the rack. Mr. Gonzales, the crane operator, had been looking to Mr. Prince and Mr. Rogers for instructions, in the form of hand signals, in stacking the pipe. Operator Gonzales stated that just before the accident occurred he had been relying on the signals of Prince as Rogers was concealed by a bush. Mr. Gonzales indicated that the sun may have hampered his view of the wires (Tr. 153, 178). According to the operator, he had set the pipe down once and was then told to raise it again ‘a little bit’ (Tr. 181). When he did, the boom of the crane touched one or more of the lines-or at least came close enough that electricity passed to the boom and through the crane with the result that both Prince and Rogers were injured.[6] According to Mr. Gonzales, ‘I heard somebody hollering;’ he looked around and saw Mr. Prince’s gloves burning. He then lowered the boom to set the pipe down as it was ‘hot’ (Tr. 176–82, 189–95). Mr. Francis arrived at the scene shortly afterward and found the boom approximately six feet below the wires (Tr. 44). The body of one worker lay at one end of the pipe and another at the other end (Tr. 112).

            Mr. de Linde believed that the boom came into contact with one or both of two lines for 10 to 15 seconds. He drew a green circle on Complainant’s Exhibit 9 to indicate which lines he thought were hit.[7] He testified that he ‘heard . . . and saw the sparks . . . and saw them fall off’ (Tr. 148–52).

            Construction Superintendent Frances was the supervisor of the work crew unloading and stacking the pipe, but he was not present when the accident occurred. He had taken the men to the place where they were working and told them to unload and stack the pipe. Mr. Frances had been away from the site for 45 minutes or so, apparently checking on another work crew. See Tr. 153–4, 158; 169, 186–9; 196, 203, 207–8. He did not recall whether the truck with the pipe had arrived at the scene before he left or not (Tr. 207).

            It was not unusual for Respondent’s work crew to work without direct supervision. According to Mr. Frances, such is a ‘common practice when you’re unloading pipe with experienced people’ (Tr. 203, see also 16–17, 21, 26–7—Wright). He considered Pedro Gonzales ‘a very good operator’ (Tr. 198).[8] Superintendent Frances referred to an earlier incident which he said involved ‘careless’ conduct on the part of Billy Rogers in unloading some timbers, adding that ‘I warned him about it’ (Tr. 200, 204). He faulted Steve de Linde for his conduct on the day of the February 26 accident on the basis that ‘he was the very best man to see what was going on’ and ‘should have said something’ (Tr. 204). He could not recall, however, that he had designated anyone to warn the crane operator about the lines (Tr. 207). Mr. de Linde testified that he was unaware that anyone was designated to give guidance to the operator (Tr. 157).

            Mr. de Linde at the time of the hearing was 22 years of age and unemployed (Tr. 146, 156). Billy Rogers, who died as a result of the accident, ‘was barely of age to come to work’ when he started working for Respondent approximately two and one-half months before the accident. President Wright estimated his age at 18 (Tr. 15). The record does not indicate what Ernest Prince’s age and experience were. Mr. Frances did indicate that he as well as Billy Rogers were young men, referring to them as ‘two boys on the ground unloading the pipe’ (Tr. 198). Pedro Gonzales had been employed by Respondent for about 13 years and had operated a crane for Respondent approximately eight years (Tr. 17; 164, 168). Construction Superintendent Frances had worked for Respondent for 19 years, 16 years of them as a supervisor (Tr. 196).

            The record indicates that Respondent did not have regular safety meetings. According to Superintendent Frances, he held a safety meeting ‘any time I see something that I don’t like or I don’t think is safe’ (Tr. 202).[9] Mr. Frances stated that he frequently warned crane operators as well as other employees of the danger of working close to power lines. Such warnings were given orally, although he said he might show an operator an OSHA rule or regulation. See Tr. 197, 201–2, 206.

            William Fay Wright, Respondent’s president, testified along the same lines with respect to safety training (Tr. 21–31). He was not certain what training Mr. Gonzales and other employees had received in operating equipment as this function was carried out by a foreman. 9[10]He testified, however, that employees were consistently reminded, in an oral manner, to stay away from power lines, preferably as far away as 15 feet. Such instruction, he said, had produced an ‘excellent record’ and ‘we’ve never had a problem like this’ (Tr. 25).

            In the cab of the crane on the day of the accident, there was a printed placard which directed that the crane not be operated within a certain distance of high voltage lines. Apparently the placard in the cab provided only for a six feet clearance in accord with an earlier State of Arkansas requirement. Respondent’s Exhibit 1 does show a placard in Respondent’s crane proscribing operation of the crane within 10 feet of high voltage lines. Compliance officer testified, however, that President Wright had told him that the placard has been put in place after the accident to replace one which ‘stated the old State law’ (Tr. 82, 98). Mr. Wright testified that he did not know when the placard was placed in the crane (Tr. 35). See Tr. 25–6, 33; also Tr. 166, 170–1.

            It was Mr. Wright’s view that Ernest Prince was the one solely responsible for the February 26, 1975, accident on the basis that ‘he was the one directing the boom and the position of the boom at the time that the accident occurred’ (Tr. 32, also 20).

            It is clear that the minimum 10 feet clearance prescribed by 29 CFR 1926.550(a)(15)(i) was not maintained on February 26, 1975. The evidence is persuasive that the boom of Respondent’s crane did touch at least one of the power lines, resulting in the death of Billy Rogers and injury to Ernest Prince.[11] It must be determined whether Respondent was responsible for such non-compliance with the cited standard.

            Respondent argues in its proposed findings and reply brief that it could not have been aware of any violation and that the accident was a result of the unforeseen carelessness of the two employees on the ground directing the crane.[12] The Secretary, on the other hand, contends that there was a serious violation of the Act and that it occurred because of inadequate supervision. Counsel for the Secretary asserts that Respondent could have ‘taken any number of steps to reduce any hazardous exposure,’ such as by de-energizing the lines, having closer supervision, and providing a detailed and comprehensive safety manual. Such measures were pursued during the trial of the case (Tr. 21–2, 26–8; 171–75, 186–87; 201–3, 206–9).

            Careful review of the record and applicable precedents persuade me to conclude that Respondent was responsible for the non-compliance and that such involved a serious violation of the Act.

            Lebanon Lumber Company, 2 OSAHRC 924 (1973), involved facts similar to those of record here. The employer there argued ‘disobedience of the deceased employee and his co-worker of express safety rules. . . .’ The Commission’s decision in that case is applicable here. It reads in part:

The Act requires that respondent do more than merely warn employees of hazards and issue instructions. The Commission has stated that an employer cannot be held to the strict standard of being an absolute guarantor or insurer of the safety of his employees. Secretary of Labor v. Standard Glass Company, Inc., OSHRC DOCKET NO. 259; Secretary of Labor v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company, OSHRC DOCKET NO. 355. The duty of the employer is to furnish his employees with a safe workplace. This necessarily implies that the employer will take whatever steps are necessary to accomplish the job safely. Employees have the concomitant duty to comply with safety standards applicable to their conduct (section 5(b) of the Act) but, ‘Final responsibility for compliance with the requirements of this Act remains with the employer.’ S.Rep. No. 91–1282, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 11 (1970).

 

            Thus, it is clear that respondent failed to take the steps necessary to assure compliance with the standard when it sent inexpert employees to perform work without supervision at a hazardous work site. This is not to say that one-on-one supervision is required at all times, but that the degree of supervision necessary must be determined on the facts of each case. * * *

            Respondent has committed a serious violation of the Act by failure to comply with the standard at 29 CFR 1910.180(j)(1)(i). The record is clear that with the exercise of reasonable diligence, i.e., proper supervision, respondent would have known of the violation. It is also distressingly clear that this violation meets the other criterion of a serious violation in that there is substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result. * * *

            The Seventh Circuit’s recent reversal of the Commission’s decision in Brennan v. Butler Lime and Cement Company and OSAHRC, —— F.2d —— (decided September 5, 1975) is also instructive. In that case, a driver of a truck crane named Kapperman died as a result of operating the crane too close to overhead lines. The employer denied it could have known of the hazardous conduct on the part of the driver, contending that it had adequately trained and instructed him in the safe operation of the crane. Speaking for the Court, Circuit Judge Pell stated:

 * * * We note, first, that if an employee is negligent or creates a violation of a safety standard, that does not necessarily prevent the employer from being held responsible for the violation. See e.g., REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1974); National Realty & Constr. Co. Inc. v. OSAHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1260 n.6, 1266 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1973). True, an employer is not an insurer under the Act. But an employer is responsible if it knew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the existence of a serious violation. A particular instance ‘of hazardous employee conduct may be considered preventable even if no employer could have detected the conduct, or its hazardous nature, at the moment of its occurrence, . . . [where] such conduct might have been precluded through feasible precautions concerning the hiring, training, and sanctioning of employees.’ National Realty, supra, 489 F.2d at 1266–67 n.37 (emphasis added).

 

            Second, the decisions at the Commission level address themselves to the foreseeability of the incident as it actually occurred rather than to the foreseeability of the general danger of coming within ten feet of power lines, i.e., the danger which was the subject of promulgated standard 1910.180(j). ‘[S]ection 17(k) [does not] reguir [e] any actual death or physical injury for a violation to occur.’ Brennan v. OSAHRC 494 F.2d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 1974). An employer must take reasonable precautionary steps to protect its employees from reasonably foreseeable recognized dangers that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical injury. And precautionary steps, of course, include the employer’s providing an adequate safety and training program. * * *

            In sum, whether a serious violation of the standard was foreseeable with the exercise of reasonable diligence depends in great part on whether Butler’s employees, Kapperman particularly, had received adequate safety instructions. * * *’

            The evidence of record indicates that the accident could have been prevented by Respondent if its work crew had been adequately supervised and trained. Respondent was not sufficiently diligent in seeing to it that its employees received adequate safety instruction. Placing of a placard in the cab of crane, even if it had proscribed operation of the crane within 10 feet of power lines, was not enough. The ‘stay away’ warning was insufficient to bring home to Respondent’s crew that someone must always observe the operation of the crane so its operator could be kept informed of the proximity of the power lines and not bring the boom within 10 feet of them.[13] Given the nature of the work area provided with the close proximity of the power lines, the training and experience of most members of the crew and the extent of the supervision provided, it was not unforeseeable that an employee would suffer death of serious physical harm.

            The method used by the Secretary in computing the proposed penalty does not comport with section 17(j) of the Act.[14] That provision requires that all civil penalties take into account the gravity of the violation as well as the employer’s size, good faith and history of previous violations.

            Respondent is by no means one of the nation’s largest employers, and its good faith has not been seriously impugned. Respondent has some history under the Act (see Danco Construction Company, 17 OSAHRC 170 (1975), and Tr. 91–2). Most significantly, however, the gravity of the violation, even though of limited duration, is high because of the nature of exposure to two of Respondent’s employees. Having considered the statutory factors for assessing penalties under the Act, a penalty of $600 is assessed.

            Based on the foregoing, the following conclusions of law entered:

            1. Respondent is now, and at all times relevant herein, an employer within the meaning of section 3 (5) of the Act, and the Commission has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;

            2. The Secretary established that Respondent failed to comply with 29 CFR 1926.550(a)(15)(i) on February 26, 1975; and

            3. Such non-compliance involved a ‘serious’ violation of the Act.

ORDER

            Based on the foregoing, and the whole record, it is ordered that

            1. Citation No. 1 issued against the Respondent on March 17, 1975, is AFFIRMED; and

            2. The penalty proposed therefor is vacated and in lieu thereof a penalty of $600 is ASSESSED.

            Harold A. Kennedy

Judge, OSAHRC

Dated: January 13, 1976



[1] The standard reads as follows:

§ 1926.550 cranes and derricks.

(a) General requirements.

(15) Except where electrical distribution and transmission lines have been deenergized and visibly grounded at point of work or where insulating barriers, not a part of or an attachment to the equipment or machinery, have been erected to prevent physical contact with the lines, equipment or machines shall be operated proximate to power lines only in accordance with the following:

(i) For lines rated 50 kv. or below, minimum clearance between the lines and any part of the crane or load shall be 10 feet . . ..

[2] Section 17(k) provides that ‘a serious violation shall be deemed to exist in a place of employment if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists, or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes which have been adopted or are in use, in such place of employment unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the violation.’

[3] Section 5(a)(2) of the Act requires each covered employer to ‘comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this Act.’

[4] Respondent’s employees are not organized (Tr. 4).

[5] There were, in addition, a flagman and at least one truck driver in the general area (Tr. 147, 157, 159).

 

[6] Neither the crane nor the power lines showed any ‘physical evidence’ of contact (Tr. 88, 97–8). Representatives of the two utility companies that owned the power lines testified that there was no indication that there was any interruption of service on the day of the accident (Tr. 131–4, 141).

 

[7] The lines circled had been identified as secondary lines (Tr. 130).

[8] Respondent’s president also considered Mr. Gonzales a very competent operator. Mr. Wright indicated that Mr. Gonzales had more authority than the other members of the work crew because of the job he was performing and his experience (Tr. 16–19).

 

[9] President Wright said ‘OSHA is a big factor’ in meetings involving foremen but there would be a discussion with a work crew only if he found ‘anything wrong’ (Tr. 28–9).

[10] Mr. Wright explained the basic movements of a crane and how they could be activated (Tr. 22–3).

 

[11] Ernest Prince was hospitalized following the accident (Tr. 18, 44).

[12] Respondent’s answer (Paragraph IV) attributes the accident to the conduct ‘of the crane operator and the injured employee in failing to follow the Respondent’s instructions.’

[13] Asked whether measures had been taken to avoid the danger of getting too close to the power lines, Respondent’s construction superintendent replied (Tr. 209):

‘Not anything that you mention. The only steps that were taken were to stay away from the lines. * * *’

The superintendent also indicated that he thought it was appropriate for ‘experienced people’ to work in the situation presented without supervision (Tr. 203). (President Wright saw no need for supervision because he thought that only a simple operation was involved. Tr. 16–7, 21.) But not all members of the work crew were so experienced as to require no supervision. Cf. James E. Roberts Company & Soule Steel Co., 7 OSAHRC 1005 (1974).

 

[14] It is apparent that the Secretary does not accept the Commission’s decision in Nacirema Operating Company, Inc., 1 OSAHRC 33. See Tr. 90–7.