UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
SECRETARY
OF LABOR, |
|
Complainant, |
|
v. |
OSHRC
DOCKET NO. 14090 |
GENERAL
MOTORS CORPORATION, DELCO AIR CONDITIONING DIVISION, |
|
Respondent. |
|
February
16, 1977
ORDER
The
Respondent has filed a Motion to Vacate the Direction for Review in the
above-captioned case. It is clear that the Respondent does not seek
modification or reversal of the Judge’s decision and, therefore, in accordance
with paragraph 1 of the Commission’s policy statement, 41 Fed. Reg. 53015
(1976), Respondent’s motion is GRANTED.
Commissioner Moran would deny the motion.
FOR THE COMMISSION:
William S. McLaughlin
Executive Secretary
Dated: FEB 16, 1977
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
SECRETARY
OF LABOR, |
|
Complainant, |
|
v. |
OSHRC
DOCKET NO. 14090 |
GENERAL
MOTORS CORPORATION, DELCO AIR CONDITIONING DIVISION, |
|
Respondent. |
|
FINAL ORDER DATE: May 14, 1976
APPEARANCES:
For the Complainant William E. Curphey, III, Trial Attorney; William J. Kilberg, Solicitor of Labor; Herman Grant, Regional
Solicitor; W. F. Kloepfer, Associate Regional
Solicitor U. S. Department of Labor 881 Federal Office Building 1240 East Ninth
Street Cleveland, Ohio 44199
For the Respondent Russell J. Thomas, Jr.,
Attorney General Motors Corporation 3044 West Grand Boulevard Detroit, Michigan
48202
DECISION AND ORDER
Oringer,
Judge:
This
is a proceeding under section 10(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651, et seq., hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) to
review a citation alleging a non-serious violation of the standard found at 29
C.F.R. 1904.4, issued by the Secretary of Labor, hereinafter referred to as
‘complainant,’ pursuant to section 9(a) of the Act, and a proposed assessment
of penalty thereon issued, in the sum of $100.00, both of which documents were
dated June 16, 1975. The citation and notification of proposed penalty were
issued after an inspection by a representative of the complainant on May 27,
1975, of the respondent’s work premises located in Moraine City, Ohio. The
respondent thereafter filed, with a representative of the complainant, a timely
notice of contest contesting the citation and proposed penalty.
The
complainant described the alleged violation as follows:
Standard
Allegedly Violated |
Description
of Alleged Violation |
29
C.F.R. 1904.4 |
Failure
to maintain a supplementary record (OSHA No. 101) for each occupational
injury or illness. E.g. employer was not maintaining a complete copy of the
supplementary record (OSHA No. 101). Date by which alleged violation must be
corrected immediate upon receipt of citation. |
The standard allegedly violated reads as follows:
29 C.F.R. 1904.4 Supplementary record.
In addition to the log of occupational
injuries and illnesses provided for under § 1904.2, each employer shall have
available for inspection at each establishment within 6 working days after
receiving information that a recordable case has occurred, a supplementary
record for each occupational injury or illness for that establishment. The
record shall be completed in the detail prescribed in the instructions
accompanying Occupational Safety and Health Administration Form OSHA No. 101.
Workmen’s compensation, insurance, or other reports are acceptable alternative
records if they contain the information required by Form OSHO No. 101. If no
acceptable alternative record is maintained for other purposes, Form OSHA No.
101 shall be used or the necessary information shall be otherwise maintained.
The
respondent, at the trial, did not contest the appropriateness of the abatement
date nor the amount of the penalty. (See Note No. 1 on page 2 of respondent’s
brief.) The sole issue remaining for decision is whether or not the standard
concerned herein was violated.
OPINION
At the
completion by the complainant of his case in chief, the respondent moved to
dismiss the citation on the grounds that the government did not prove a prima
facie case. This tribunal reserved ruling on the respondent’s motion. The
respondent rested its case without presenting any proof on the grounds that the
Secretary had not made out a case.
This
tribunal, while it modified its ruling and reserved on the motion, expressed an
opinion at the time that, based on recollection, the complainant had proven a
Prima facie case. After thoroughly examining and studying the transcript, we
believe that our recollection was erroneous and that the evidence of record
indicates that the Secretary failed to prove a prima facie case.
In
order for the complainant to prove a prima facie case, it must establish that
there was a recordable injury that the respondent had a duty to include in a
supplementary record (OSHA Form No. 101 or equivalent). Secretary v. J. E. Roupp & Company, Inc. & Denver Dry Wall Company,
Docket Nos. 146 and 147, 7 OSAHRC 919 at page 936; Secretary v.
Intermountain Block & Pipe Corp., Docket No. 298, 1 OSAHRC 455 at page
461, 462; Secretary v. Wayne Taysom & Eli Taysom, d/b/a Taysom
Construction Company, Docket No. 1141, 15 OSAHRC 506 at pages 515, 516,
517.
While
the cited cases are not identical to the one in question, the principle insofar
as the quantum of proof that the Secretary needs remains the same. In this
case, this tribunal is firmly convinced that there were injuries over the years
that OSHA is in effect, in this plant. In the case at bar, the respondent keeps
a supplementary form, marked Exhibit No. 1, that was exhibited to the
compliance officer. The record evidence revealed that the compliance officer’s
main complaint with the form is that it does not indicate the name of the
physician who treated the injured employee and, in addition thereto, the
details of what the employee was doing when injured. The compliance officer
also complained that the name of the company was not on the form. He further
complained, on page 22 of the transcript, that the respondent’s form was not as
specific as that of the Secretary. He related that item 13 of the Secretary’s
form reads, ‘How did the accident occur?’ and requires the employer to describe
fully the events that resulted in the injury or occupational illness. In
addition, he complains that No. 12 of the Secretary’s form, which reads, ‘What
was the employee doing when injured?’ is also deficient on the employer’s form.
He also complains that the name of the physician and/or hospital was missing,
which are items 13 and 19 on the Secretary’s form.
The
major deficiency in the Secretary’s case is that the complainant’s compliance
officer never determined that there was any one case where a physician actually
treated the employee and whose name was lacking in the employer’s form, nor did
he determine that anyone was hospitalized and the name of hospital missing in
the employer’s form. He further did not delineate one case where a full
description was necessary.
The
Secretary may well, upon proper investigation and review of the employer’s
form, and inspection and investigation of any one or several cases, find that
items are in fact missing that should be there; however, in the instant cause,
this type of proof is wholly absent in the record. While the complainant failed
to establish such proof, this tribunal, in a search for proof of whether or not
the facts existed, searchingly examined the compliance officer and was not able
to establish any cases where the items, in fact, were proven missing. After the
witness complained that one of the items in which the employer was deficient
was the item requiring the name of the physician, he was asked, as follows, on
page 24 of the transcript:
‘The Court: So, did you find out whether
any were treated by a physician whose names were not on the report?
The Witness: No, sir. Just my personal
experience when I was with the Turner Construction Company, I was also the
‘first aider’ and it just happened that many times people—’
Transcript page 25:
‘The Court: I can’t hear you.
The Witness: People get slight injuries
and they just don’t require any big attention, except maybe cleaning and small
dressing. This is, according to the Act, this doesn’t require any logging in.
The Court: I see. In other words, if an
injury is logged in, you would say that a physician is usually called?
The Witness: Not necessarily. If it’s
recordable, if it says it’s a recordable injury, to be treated by a physician
and nurse.’
‘The Court: Well, why don’t you find out?
In the instances that, in those cases the physician’s name is not on the
report, was the physician in fact utilized?
The Witness: Well, there’s so many there,
it’s been so long, that I just can’t recall.
The Court: Did you make notes: Would your
notes help you?
The Witness: I don’t recall making notes
on the particular—’
Certainly, there was no case prove that a physician’s
name was necessary or missing. Insofar as specific details, there is no proof
in the record that the employee’s medical record would not have the specific
details written in. Boxes do show areas where the accident may have happened
and what part of the body was injured. There is no proof that somewhere in the
area reserved for notes that the missing items would not be written in. The
only way the Secretary could prove that the employer’s supplementary records
are deficient is if he follows a report of a given injury and finds items
missing and is able to clearly present such proof upon the trial of the issue.
The standard at issue states, inter alia:
‘Workmen’s compensation, insurance, or
other reports are acceptable alternative records if they contain the
information required by Form OSHA No. 101. If no acceptable alternative record
is maintained for other purposes, Form OSHA No. 101 shall be used or the
necessary information shall be otherwise maintained.’
In
order to prove that the alternative record maintained by the respondent is
deficient, the government should at least be able to present one case wherein
it was in fact deficient. In this case, the recollection of the government’s
witness was hazy and deficient insofar as the items are concerned and could not
prove even one record of injury where the items he complained of were missing.
There is no proof that such items were necessary. This is not to say that, if
the government reenters the respondent’s workplace, and examines the records,
and finds that the supplementary record is deficient in any of the items
contained in the OSHA Form No. 101, he could not prove his case. All this
tribunal is finding in the instant cause is that the Secretary has failed to
adduce sufficient proof to sustain a violation on the evidence of record. As
far as the complaint found on page 13 of the transcript that the employer’s
name is not on the record, we find that a specious objection. Certainly, an
inspecting compliance officer should know the name of the plant he is visiting.
This
tribunal agrees with the government that details as to where and how the
accident happened, the name of the physician, and the name of the hospital, are
necessary items. They aid the administration in
adducing facts that are necessary to determine matters seriously concerned with
the health and welfare of the employees at the plant. The failure here is to
demonstrate that, in any given specific case, such items were missing on the
alternative form maintained by the respondent. The witness testified, on page
13 of the transcript, that in comparing the form with the Form OSHA No. 101 he
believed there was something like ‘7, 8, possibly 10, items that were not
exactly as such, and supposed to be with the 101.’ These were not delineated.
There were three items that were fully complained of, however, were not proven
deficient inasmuch as no one case was pursued to see whether these items were
in fact missing.
The
record further indicates the poverty of proof contained therein, on page 22 of
the transcript. The record reads as follows:
‘The Court: Let me ask you this. Did you
look, when you looked at their records, did you look through the book of
records? Did you look through these records?
The Witness: No, I did not, sir, as I
recall.’
From
the evidence of record, this tribunal cannot determine whether or not the
alternative supplementary record maintained by the respondent contains all of
the criteria demanded by the Secretary’s Form OSHA No. 101, because sufficient
evidence is not contained in the record about any one case where items were
missing. Accordingly, the complainant has failed to prove a prima facie case,
and the allegation of violation must fall.
Having
heard the testimony and observed the demeanor of the witness, and having
considered the same, together with the citation, notification of proposed
penalty, notice of contest, pleadings, representations, stipulations, and
admission of the parties, the preponderance of credible evidence of record
supports the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
The respondent employs approximately 1908 employees, in and about the workplace
complained of herein. The said employees are engaged in the receipt and
handling of asbestos, rubber, steel, and other goods which have been shipped
from states outside the State of Ohio, into Ohio, and produces and ships
compressors and valves, to points outside the State of Ohio. (Complaint and
Answer)
2. As
a result of an inspection by a representative of the complainant, the
respondent was issued a citation on June 16, 1975, alleging one non-serious
violation of the Act and a notification of proposed penalty. (Complaint and
Answer)
3. A
timely notice of contest was filed by the respondent to the citation and
notification of proposed penalty (Notice of Contest).
4.
The parties agreed that the abatement date and the amount of the penalty were
not in issue. (See Note 1 of page 2 of respondent’s brief.)
5.
The complainant failed to sufficiently inspect the respondent’s records so as
to determine whether or not any item found on the OSHA 101 was missing, in any
given specific case, from the record proffered by the respondent to the
complainant as an alternative supplementary record (Tr. pages 22, 24, 25, 26).
6. At
the close of the complainant’s case, the respondent moved to dismiss on the
grounds that the complainant had not proved a prima facie case (Tr. page 26, et
seq.).
Based
on the aforementioned Findings of Fact and the entire record, the Judge makes
the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. At
all times herein mentioned, this respondent was engaged in a business affecting
commerce, within the meaning of section 3 (5) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970.
2.
The complainant failed to sustain the burden of proof of violation of that
standard found at 29 C.F.R. 1904.4.
In
view of the foregoing, good cause appearing therefor, it is ORDERED that:
1.
The motion of the respondent to dismiss the complainant’s citation and proposed
penalty on the grounds that it had not proven a prima facie case as GRANTED.
2.
The citation alleging a violation of that standard found at 29 C.F.R. 1904.4 is
herewith VACATED.
3.
The penalty proposed in the sum of $100.00 is similarly VACATED.
SO
ORDERED.
David G. Oringer
Judge, OSAHRC
Dated: April 14, 1976