United States of America
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
1120 20th Street, N.W., Ninth Floor
Washington, DC 20036-3457
SECRETARY
OF LABOR, |
|
Complainant, |
|
v. |
OSHRC Docket
No. 12-1287 |
CSA EQUIPMENT COMPANY, LLC, |
|
Respondent |
|
APPEARANCES:
Carla M. Casas, Attorney; Christopher D. Helms, Counsel;
Stanley E. Keen, Regional Solicitor; M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor;
U.S. Department of Labor, Atlanta, GA
For
the Complainant
McCord Wilson, Attorney, Rader & Campbell, P.C.; Ron
Signorino, Consultant, The Blueoceana Company, Inc.
For the
Respondent
REMAND
ORDER
Before: ROGERS, Chairman; ATTWOOD, Commissioner.
BY
THE COMMISSION:
CSA
Equipment Company, LLC, a stevedoring company, handles cargo at the Port of
Mobile, Alabama. CSA’s work includes unloading
cargo from vessels, as well as checking and transferring large steel coils. On December 29, 2011, a CSA employee was
struck by a forklift while checking a coil and later died from his injuries. At that time, CSA used a process whereby the coils
were unloaded from a vessel and delivered by forklift to the doors of a CSA
warehouse where an employee, known as a “checker,” was stationed. The checker would check the coil, and then
signal for a forklift to come and move it to a location inside the warehouse.
Following
an inspection, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration issued CSA a
one-item serious citation alleging a violation of section 5(a)(1) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 654 (a)(1).[1]
The citation alleged that CSA “failed to
provide a clear view of the designated path of travel for the powered
industrial trucks, exposing employees to crushing hazards while materials are
checked into the warehouse,” and listed three alternative abatement methods. After a hearing, Administrative Law Judge
Sharon D. Calhoun issued a decision in which she affirmed the citation. She did not address the first two abatement
methods proposed by the Secretary in the citation, but concluded that the third
method—setting up a separate “safe area” where employees could check coils free
from forklift struck-by hazards—was feasible, because she found that CSA had
already implemented that method when it moved its coil-checking operation from
the warehouse to the dock after the accident.
In its petition for review, CSA contends that the judge erred in concluding
that this is a feasible method of abating the cited hazard.[2] For the following reasons, we remand this
case to the judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A
method of abatement is feasible under section 5(a)(1) if the Secretary
“demonstrate[s] both that the measure[] [is] capable of being put into effect and that [it] would be effective in
materially reducing the incidence of the hazard.” Beverly
Enters., Inc., 19 BNA OSHC 1161, 1190, 2000 CCH OSHD ¶ 32,227, p. 48,981
(No. 91-3344, 2000) (consolidated) (emphasis added); see Champlin Petroleum Co. v. OSHRC, 593 F.2d 637, 640 (5th Cir.
1979) (“It is the Secretary’s burden
to show that demonstrably feasible measures would materially reduce the
likelihood that such injury as that which resulted from the cited hazard would
have occurred.”). The Secretary is not
required to show that the proposed abatement would completely eliminate the
hazard. Acme Energy Servs., 23 BNA OSHC 2121, 2127, 2009-2012 CCH OSHD ¶ 33,236,
p. 56,129 (No. 08-0088, 2012), aff’d, 542 F. App’x. 356 (5th Cir. 2013); Morrison-Knudsen Co./Yonkers Contracting
Co., 16 BNA OSHC 1105, 1122, 1993-1995 CCH OSHD ¶ 30,048, p. 41,279 (No.
88-572, 1993). But if the proposed
abatement “creates additional hazards rather than reducing or eliminating the
alleged hazard, the citation must be vacated for failure to prove feasibility .
. . .” Kokosing Constr. Co., 17 BNA OSHC 1869, 1875 n.19, 1995-1997
CCH OSHD ¶ 31,207, p. 43,727 n.19 (No. 92-2596, 1996); Royal Logging Co., 7 BNA OSHC 1744, 1751, 1979 CCH OSHD ¶
23,914, p. 28,997-98 (No. 15169, 1979) (finding it proper to reject proposed abatement
methods that “cause consequences so adverse as to render their use infeasible”),
aff’d, 645 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1981)).
Here,
the judge found that “[s]ince CSA implemented the abatement method
without technological, economic, or other adverse consequences, the issue of
abatement feasibility is essentially rendered moot.” She also found that “[f]or the same reason,
CSA’s greater hazard defense fails.” In
concluding that implementation of this abatement method resulted in no “adverse
consequences,” the judge refused to consider testimony from CSA’s expert, John
Faulk, who testified that implementing the abatement method exposed CSA
employees to other hazards. She found
Faulk’s testimony on this point “unreliable” because she viewed his testimony
that “you couldn’t conduct cargo handling operations unless you had people on
the ground and you had machines in the immediate area[,]” as in conflict with her
factual finding that CSA had “in fact” completely separated the checkers from
the forklifts while they check the coils at the dock.
But
Faulk did not testify that this abatement method could not be implemented nor
did he suggest that CSA had not already done so. On the contrary, when
the Secretary questioned Faulk about this specific method, he responded:
“Reluctantly I believe they have [implemented it]. Yes.” Rather, according to
Faulk, there are two “adverse consequences” to using this
method: (1) checkers are still exposed to the “immediate area” where the forklifts operate, and
(2) checking coils on the dock presents additional hazards—specifically,
increased traffic from other moving vehicles such as small forklifts, 18-wheeler
trucks, and road trucks, as well as hazards posed by overhead crane loads.
In
determining whether this proposed abatement method “will cause consequences so
adverse as to render [its] use infeasible[,]” Royal Logging Co., 7 BNA OSHC at 1751,
1979 CCH OSHD at p. 28,997-98, the judge should have considered Faulk’s
testimony in this regard, along with other evidence indicating that the
proposed abatement method fails to materially reduce the cited hazard and in
fact, introduces other hazards to which the checkers are exposed. See
also Kokosing, 17 BNA OSHC
at 1875 n.19, 1995-1997 CCH OSHD at p. 43,727 n.19 (Secretary has the burden of
rebutting evidence that abatement method presented a greater hazard); Western Mass. Electric Co., 9 BNA OSHC 1940,
1945 n.11, 1981 CCH OSHD ¶ 25,470, p. 31,766 n.11 (No. 76-1174, 1981) (referring
to principle articulated in Royal Logging
Co. that there is no greater hazard defense per se in case arising under section 5(a)(1), i.e., “evidence which
would be relevant to the affirmative defense of ‘greater hazard’ under §
5(a)(2) is properly treated as rebuttal evidence to the Secretary’s case [for a
§ 5(a)(1) violation].”).
Accordingly, on remand, the judge shall
determine, based on all of the evidence in the record, whether the method of
separating the checkers and the forklifts proposed by the Secretary will
materially reduce or eliminate the cited hazard, taking into account whether
implementing that method of abatement would create safety consequences so
adverse as to render its use infeasible.
If the judge concludes that the Secretary did not establish this as a
feasible method of abatement, she shall determine whether the two other methods
of abatement proposed by the Secretary are feasible.[3]
SO
ORDERED.
/s/
Thomasina V. Rogers
Chairman
/s/
Cynthia L. Attwood
Dated: March 26, 2014 Commissioner
United States of America
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
1924 Building – Room 2R90, 100 Alabama Street SW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3104
Secretary of Labor, |
|
Complainant, |
|
v. |
OSHRC Docket No. 12-1287 |
CSA Equipment Company, LLC, |
|
Respondent. |
|
Appearances:
Carla M. Casas,
Esquire, U. S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Atlanta, Georgia
For
the Complainant
Ronald
L. Signorino, Consultant, The Blueoceana Company, Inc., Basking Ridge, New
Jersey
For the Respondent
Before:
Administrative Law Judge Sharon D. Calhoun
DECISION AND ORDER
CSA Equipment Company
(CSA) is a Mobile, Alabama, based stevedoring company which engages in cargo
handling at the Port of Mobile. On
January 30, 2012, an Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
Compliance Safety and Health Officer (CSHO) conducted an inspection of CSA’s
facility located at 55 State Docks Road, Mobile, Alabama. The inspection was
initiated due to the death of an employee which occurred on January 29,
2012. The employee’s death resulted from
injuries he sustained in an accident on December 29, 2011. The employee was crushed while engaging in
the steel coil operation at the facility.
As a result of the inspection, the Secretary issued a serious citation
to CSA on June 4, 2012.
The serious citation
alleges CSA violated the general duty clause set out at § 5(a)(1) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (Act) by failing to provide a
clear view of the designated path of travel for powered industrial trucks. This failure exposed employees to crushing
hazards as they checked materials into the warehouse. The Secretary proposed three feasible means
of abatement which included installing mirrors on the forklift, providing
spotters, and establishing a safe area separate from the forklift operating
areas for checker/clerk[4]
employees to work in. The Secretary
proposed a penalty of $6,300.00 for this alleged violation.
CSA timely contested the
citation. It contends the Secretary did
not meet her burden of proof for the alleged general duty clause violation and
that the general duty clause is inappropriately cited because a specific
standard is applicable. CSA also argues
that the methods of abatement proposed by the Secretary for the alleged general
duty clause violation are not feasible.
The undersigned held a hearing in this matter on December 20, 2012 and
January 23, 2013, in Mobile, Alabama.
The parties filed post-hearing briefs on April 1, 2013.
For the reasons discussed
below, the citation is affirmed as serious and a penalty of $6,300.00 is
assessed.
Jurisdiction
At the hearing, the
parties stipulated that jurisdiction of this action is conferred upon the
Commission pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act. The parties also stipulated at the hearing
that at all times relevant to this action, CSA was an employer engaged in a
business affecting interstate commerce within the meaning of section 3(5) of
the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (Tr. 10-11).
Background
CSA
is a stevedoring company which engages in cargo handling at the Port of Mobile
in Mobile, Alabama. CSA’s employees are
union employees provided by the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA)
Local 1410. The longshoremen provided by
ILA include lift drivers, crane operators, and labor workers (Tr. 22, 122,
123). Some of the longshoreman employed
by CSA work as cargo handlers who load and unload ships, railcars, trucks, and
trailers on the marine terminal (Tr. 21).
On December 29, 2011, one
of CSA’s longshoremen working as a checker was injured when he was struck by a
forklift and crushed between the counterweight of the forklift and a steel coil
(Tr. 178). The employee succumbed to
his injuries on January 29, 2012 (Tr. 230-231).
OSHA initiated its inspection of the jobsite the next day, January 30,
2012. OSHA’s inspection was conducted by
OSHA Compliance Officer Eliseo Hernandez (Tr. 177). During the inspection, Hernandez was informed
by CSA management that the deceased employee had been struck by the rear end of
a forklift and was caught between the rear end of the forklift and the steel
coil (Tr. 178).
The forklift believed to
be involved in the accident is Forklift 16744, manufactured by Taylor (Tr.
29-30; Exh. C-3). It is a 30,000 pound
machine (Tr. 31). Standard operating
procedure when transferring steel coils was for the forklift operators to
operate the forklift in reverse for better driver visibility (Tr. 33-34). Although visibility was better in reverse,
the area directly behind the counterweight on the forklift posed an obstruction
for the operator, creating a blind spot (Tr. 34). An alarm on the forklift sounds constantly
when operating the forklift in reverse (Tr. 35). Checker interviews revealed that they were
briefed to be aware of the blind spot behind the forklift and to be aware of,
or to avoid, the rear of the forklift (Tr. 187).
CSA checkers are
responsible for checking the cargo as it comes off the vessel. The cargo was large, consisting of steel
coils, rolls of plump paper, and bundles (Tr. 79). The coils range in height from knee high to
taller than a checker (Tr. 80, 100).
Checking the cargo involves retrieving the identification number from
coils unloaded from the vessel and checking it with the bill of lading,
manifest or check sheet. In order to
obtain the identification number, sometimes checkers would have to bend or
crouch to be able to read the label (Tr. 37).
When checkers were bent down, they could not be seen by the forklift
operator due to the counter weight. The
checkers also check the coil to ascertain its condition by walking around the
coil looking for gouges or dents in the metal (Tr. 36, 79, 80). After checking for damage, the checkers use a
magic marker to write the location of the coil’s destination on the coil, so
the forklift operators will know where to place the coils in the warehouse (Tr.
81). This coil checking procedure
underwent changes before and after the accident.
The coil checking
procedure in place at the facility prior to the accident involved using a
forklift to remove the steel coils from the ship and taking them to the door of
the warehouse where a checker would be standing at the opening near the yellow
safety posts. The forklift operator placed
the steel coil on the ground for the checker (Tr. 131). The steel coils were delivered to the checker
one at a time. The checker would then
check the steel coil as described above.
Once the checker finished, he or she would signal for a forklift
operating inside the warehouse to retrieve the steel coil and take it to the
proper place in the warehouse (Tr. 131, 135-136, 179-180). The forklift inside the warehouse could not
retrieve the steel coil until the checker let the operator know where the coil was
to be placed. This procedure was changed
in December 2010 in response to the needs of a customer who wanted to have
steel coils unloaded more quickly (Tr. 137-140, 143).
The new procedure
implemented in December 2010 was in use on the day of the accident. With the new procedure, clerks continued to
be stationed by the doorway. However,
once a coil was transported by the forklift to the doorway where the checker
was located and placed on the ground, the forklift operator immediately
returned to the vessel to retrieve another coil and bring it to the checker
(Tr. 39-40). With this new procedure, at
times there were several coils (ten or more) in the area of the checker. Accumulations of ten coils occurred often
(Tr. 98). The procedure resulted in
forklifts being operated in the area where coils already delivered to the
warehouse door were being checked (Tr. 84).
There were no barriers to separate or protect the clerks from the forklift
traffic, and there were no designated paths for the forklifts in the warehouse
(Tr. 47-48, 322). The forklift route
depended on the load, the way the warehouse was stacked, and where the checkers
were in proximity to the forklifts (Tr. 187-188). CSA relied on the forklift operator and the
clerk to communicate during the process.
CSA also relied on employees staying out of the way and making sure they
were not hit by the forklift (Tr. 323).
After the accident the
procedure was changed so that the coils are handled on the dock (Tr. 99). With this procedure, clerks are located
shipside, outside of the warehouse. As
soon as the coils are lowered from the ship to the ground by the crane and the
crane moves away, the checker goes over to check the coils (Tr. 115-116). After the checking is completed shipside, the
checkers walk to where the other longshoremen are located (Tr. 114). Forklifts do not approach to move the coils
until all the coils are checked and the checkers have moved away (Tr. 95,
97).
During the inspection,
Hernandez took measurements which included measuring the blind spot created by
the design of the Taylor 330, 30,000 pound forklift (Tr. 180, 186). The height of the counterweight in
the rear of the forklift was measured to be 5.1 feet (Tr. 185; Exh. C-14). The smallest coil was measured to be 3.8 feet
(Tr. 182; Exh. C-11).
As a result of Hernandez’s
inspection, the Secretary issued the citation that gave rise to the instant
case.
The
Citation
The citation alleges a
serious violation of the general duty clause, § 5(a)(1) of the Act. Section 5(a)(1) requires each employer to
“furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which
are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees.”
29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). The citation alleges a violation of § 5(a)(1) as
follows:
In warehouse North “A”: On or about December 29, 2011 and at times
prior to; the employer failed to provide a clear view of the designated path of
travel for the powered industrial trucks, exposing employees to crushing
hazards while materials are checked into the warehouse.
As a feasible means of
abatement, OSHA proposed:
[I]nstallation
of mirrors on the forklift that would allow for unobstructed vision to the rear during backing or to
provide spotters to safely marshal the forklifts to the rear so that a clear view of the path of travel can be
maintained and allow for the operator
can [sic] observe for other traffic, personnel and safe clearances as prescribed by the ‘Safety Standard for
Low Lift and High Lift Trucks’ ANSI B56.1-2009,
paragraph 5.3.6. Additionally, the
employer could establish a safe area
that was separate from the forklift operating areas where the checker/clerk employees could perform their duties free
from forklift struck-by hazards.
DISCUSSION
Applicability
of a Specific Standard
CSA contends that a
specific standard is applicable which addresses the hazards for which the
Secretary cites CSA. Therefore, CSA
contends the Secretary has improperly cited a violation of § 5(a)(1) of the
Act. The Secretary disagrees. It is well-settled Commission precedent that
a citation under § 5(a)(1) of the Act is only proper if no specific standard
applies. Applicability of a specific
standard will preempt the general duty clause, with respect to conditions or
practices expressly covered by the specific standards. Con Agra, Inc., 11 BNA OSHC 1141 (No. 79-1146, 1983).
CSA contends that the
standard found at § 1917.43(b)(8) is applicable and should have been cited in
lieu of the general duty clause (CSA’s brief, p. 13). The standard found at § 1917.43(b)(8)
provides as follows regarding powered industrial trucks:
The employer shall
direct drivers to slow down and sound the horn at crossaisles and other
locations were visibility is obstructed.
This standard is one of the Marine
Terminals standards found in Part 1917.
Subpart A of the Marine Terminals standards sets forth general
provisions regarding the scope and applicability of these standards. Section 1917.1 provides in relevant part:
(a)
The
regulations of this part apply to employment within a marine terminal as
defined in § 1917.2, including the loading, unloading, movement or other
handling of cargo, ship’s stores or gear within the terminal…All cargo transfer
accomplished with the use of shore-based material handling devices shall be
regulated by this part.
Part 1917, therefore, is applicable to the
cargo handling operations performed by CSA.
Further, the applicability provision of § 1917.43 provides in relevant
part that the “section applies to every type of powered industrial truck used
for material or equipment handling within a marine terminal.” Therefore, the forklifts and other powered
industrial trucks used for material handling by CSA, at the marine terminal,
would be generally covered by the standard.
But the inquiry does not stop there.
As set forth above, in assessing the applicability, the conditions or
practices expressly covered by the specific standard are determinative. Con Agra, Inc., id. CSA is of the mistaken
belief that because a standard in general applies, that every subsection of the
standard also applies regardless of the conditions or practices expressly
covered by the specific standard. The specific standard found at § 1917.43(b)(8)
sets forth conditions and practices that must be considered in determining
whether that standard applies. It is
applicable where visibility is obstructed such as at crossaisles and other
locations. Evidence adduced at the
hearing addressed the meaning of the phrase “where visibility is obstructed”
used in § 1917.43(b)(8). The
Secretary’s expert, Paul Rossi, Safety and Health Specialist in the Office of
Maritime Enforcement for OSHA, testified that the regulation did not apply
because the standard applies to intersections or other areas where visibility
is obstructed (Tr. 422). Rossi was very
familiar with this standard because he was part of an association that
submitted comments into the rule making record relating to Part 1917, and
specifically the provisions covered in § 1917.43(b)(8) (Tr. 388, 390-392). It is not disputed that the obstruction at
issue in this case was not at a crossaisle or other location, but instead was
due to the counterweight that was a part of the forklift. This type of obstructed visibility is not
covered by this specific standard, and a review of Part 1917 does not reveal
any other applicable standard which would preempt the general duty clause
citation. The standard found at §
1917.43(b)(8) is not applicable. Section
5(a)(1) applies to the cited condition.
Elements
of a § 5(a)(1) Violation
Section 5(a)(1) of the Act mandates
that each employer “furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). To establish a violation of the general duty
clause, the Secretary must show that:
(1) a condition or activity in the workplace presented a hazard; (2) the
employer or its industry recognized the hazard; (3) the hazard was likely to
cause death or serious physical harm; and (4) a feasible means existed to
eliminate or materially reduce the hazard.
Pegasus Tower, 21 BNA OSHC
1190, 1191, 2005 CCH OSHD ¶ 32,861, p.
53,077 (No. 01-0547, 2005).
Erickson
Air-Crane, Inc., 2012
WL 762001 at *2 (No. 07-0645, 2012).
In
addition to the above-quoted elements of a § 5(a)(1) violation, the Secretary
must also establish the employer had either actual or constructive knowledge of
the hazardous condition. Deep South Crane & Rigging Co., 23
BNA OSHC 2099 (No. 09-0240, 2012), aff’d
Deep South Crane & Rigging Co. v. Seth D. Harris, 24 BNA OSHD 1089 (5th
Cir. 2013).
Whether
an Activity or Condition at the site Constituted a Hazard
The
Secretary contends that when operating the forklift in reverse, the operator’s
view to the rear was obstructed and that employees working in the area of the
forklift were exposed to the hazard of being struck by the forklift
(Secretary’s brief, p.18). The record
evidence reveals that an employee was struck by a forklift and fatally
injured.
OSHA’s
investigation revealed forklifts were operating in proximity to checkers while
they were checking the coils. No
barriers precluded the forklifts from coming into contact with the checkers as
they performed their duties. At the time
of the accident, there were six forklifts in operation at the facility, three
inside the warehouse and three outside on the dock (Tr. 39-40, 88, 187). While performing their tasks, checkers
sometimes crouched down beside the coils and, while doing so, they were not
visible to the forklift operators, subjecting them to being struck by the
30,000 pound equipment. These were the
conditions at the time the checker was struck by a forklift on December 29,
2011.
Michael Crimson, employed
as a checker/clerk by CSA since August 2011, testified at the hearing. According to Crimson, whenever a forklift
approached he could hear it so he tried to make sure he was seen (Tr. 85). At times there could be more than one
forklift accessing his pile of coils (Tr. 86).
Crimson testified that although forklifts would not come up to the coil
he was working on, if there were other coils in his area, the forklift would
come up and retrieve those coils (Tr. 87).
Forklifts operated both forward and in reverse, in proximity to Crimson,
to retrieve coils and move them away from him (Tr. 92). The undersigned finds the conditions and
activities at the jobsite were hazardous and that employees were exposed to the
hazard of being struck by a forklift.
Whether
CSA or its Industry Recognized that the Activity or Condition was Hazardous
A recognized hazard is a
practice, procedure or condition under the employer’s control that is known to
be hazardous by the cited employer or the employer’s industry. Pelron
Corp., 12 BNA OSHC 1833, 1835 (No. 82-388, 1986). The Secretary contends that both CSA and the
marine cargo handling industry recognized the hazard.
Regarding whether CSA
recognized the hazard, the evidence adduced at the hearing shows that CSA
implemented the coil checking procedure in place at the time of the inspection,
and was aware that there were no boundaries between the forklifts and the
checkers/clerks. Its foremen and general
superintendents attended briefings before each offloading operation during which
the hazards of working near forklifts as well as the blind spots behind the
forklifts were discussed (Tr. 191-192, 285-286). CSA management warned employees to
watch out for the forklifts (Tr. 46, 51).
Also, as reflected in minutes from CSA safety meetings, CSA was aware
that forklifts hit posts during the coil operation procedure. During those meetings concern was expressed
that if not careful, the next time a person could be struck by a forklift (Tr.
55, 57; Exh. C-7). Mark Bass, President
of ILA Local 1410, testified that he had called CSA General Superintendent
Miles Covington with concerns about the procedure which was in place at the
time of the accident. He told Covington
he was concerned that the clerks and checkers were in harms way (Tr. 140). CSHO Hernandez determined that at least three
CSA employees were exposed to the hazard (Tr. 194). Undoubtedly, CSA recognized there was a
hazard of employees being struck by a forklift as employees were in proximity
to the forklifts while they were engaged in the coil checking procedure.
In addition to CSA’s
recognition of the hazard, the record supports a finding that the marine cargo
handling industry also recognized the hazard.
Paul Rossi, OSHA’s Office of Maritime Enforcement Safety and Health Specialist,
was qualified as an expert in the field of safety and marine cargo handling
operations to testify whether the industry recognizes struck-by hazards and
whether CSA should have protected its employees from said hazards (Tr. 335,
347). Rossi referred to Exhibit C-18 as
demonstrating the industries’ recognition of the hazard. Rossi testified that Exhibit C-18 was not
produced by OSHA, but instead was developed by the Maritime Advisory Committee
which is comprised of various experts and others in the marine cargo handling
industry as well as the shipyard industry.
According to Rossi, the document addresses how to prevent accidents,
particularly involving container handling (Tr. 350-352). Rossi testified that the marine cargo
handling industry recognized the hazard of employees being struck by mobile
equipment when working in proximity to the equipment (Tr. 360-361). The undersigned finds that both CSA and the
marine handling cargo industry recognized the cited hazard.
Whether
the Hazard Caused or was Likely to Cause Death or Serious Physical Harm
There is no question, and
the facts of this case demonstrate, the hazard cited in this case caused
death. An employee who worked as a
checker was hit by a forklift and crushed between the forklift and a steel coil
(Tr. 178). Approximately thirty days
after the accident, the employee died (Tr. 177, 230-231; Exh. R-10). The violation is properly characterized as a
serious violation. The Secretary has
established the third element of his burden of proof.
Whether
Feasible Means Existed to Eliminate or Materially Reduce the Hazard
The Secretary proposed
three abatement methods to alleviate the hazard of being struck by the
forklift: (1) installing mirrors on the
forklift to compensate for the obstructed view when operating in reverse; (2)
providing spotters to secure a clear path of travel to the rear as set forth in
ANSI B56.1-2009; or (3) establishing a safe area for the checkers/clerks by
separating them from the forklifts (Citation and Notification of Penalty). CSA disputes that a feasible means exists to
eliminate or materially reduce the hazard and takes issue with each of the
abatement methods proposed by the Secretary. Nonetheless, after the accident,
CSA implemented the third abatement method proposed by the Secretary of
separating the forklift operations from the clerks. As a result, CSA now requires its clerks to
work shipside rather than at the warehouse, and requires them to check all
coils once they are lowered from the ship.
Once the checking is completed, the clerks move to a safe area away from
the coils, and only then are forklifts allowed to retrieve the coils (Tr.
115-116).
The Secretary only is
required to set forth one feasible means of abatement. The evidence supports a
finding that the abatement method implemented by CSA is feasible; therefore,
the undersigned will not address the feasibility of the other two proposed
abatement methods.
CSA contends that
checkers and forklifts cannot always be separated because of the nature of the
marine cargo handling operations. The
issue is not whether they always can be separated, but whether they can be
separated during the coil checking operation so that they are not exposed to
the hazard of being struck by a forklift.
The fact that CSA has implemented a procedure separating the forklifts
from the checker/clerks is in direct conflict with its argument that this
cannot be done. No evidence was adduced
at the hearing to show that separating the forklifts from the checker/clerks
was technologically or economically infeasible or impractical. Further, Rossi testified that it could be
done (Tr. 370-372).
Eustis John Faulk
testified as an expert for CSA. He has
an extensive background in marine terminal cargo operations and applicable OSHA
regulations as well as the industry’s consensus standards (Tr. 436-441). Faulk was qualified as an expert to testify
generally regarding occupational safety and health at marine terminals and to
render opinions regarding the accident in this case, the OSHA standards,
consensus standards and the manner in which the investigation was conducted
(Tr. 443-444). Faulk addressed the
feasibility of separating checker/clerks from the forklifts and testified that
it is not feasible because “you couldn’t conduct cargo handling operations
unless you had people on the ground and you had machines in the immediate
area.” (Tr. 462). The fact that CSA is
in fact separating the checkers/clerks and forklifts and there is no evidence that
CSA is adversely affected by doing so, renders Faulk’s testimony
unreliable. Therefore, the undersigned
credits Rossi’s testimony on this issue over Faulk’s. Since CSA implemented the abatement method
without technological, economic, or other adverse consequences, the issue of
abatement feasibility is essentially rendered moot. For the same reason, CSA’s greater hazard
defense fails. A feasible means of
abatement is established.
Whether
CSA had Knowledge of the Violative Condition
An
essential requirement for meeting the Secretary’s burden of proof is
establishing the employer had knowledge of the hazard. “As part of the Secretary’s prima facie case, [he] must show that
the employer had actual knowledge of the violation or could have discovered it
with the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Otis
Elevator Co., 21 BNA OSHC at 2207.
The
Secretary contends CSA had actual knowledge of the violative conditions and it
should have known of the conditions.
According to the Secretary, knowledge is established because CSA
implemented the procedure in place at the time of the accident and the
conditions were in plain view (Secretary’s brief, p. 24-26). In further support, the Secretary asserts the
general superintendent had knowledge of the conditions in the warehouse because
he was the one who determines how things were going to be offloaded and
directed the operation (Tr. 195). CSA
does not dispute knowledge.
The
record evidence shows that for business reasons, CSA implemented a coil
checking procedure which placed employees in proximity to operating
forklifts. There were no barriers
separating the employees from the forklifts and no designated paths of travel
for the forklifts. Forklifts operate in
reverse to retrieve coils although a blind spot on the forklift obstructs the
view from the rear of the forklift. CSA
was aware that employees crouched to check the coils and when doing so might
not be seen by the forklift operator.
Issues associated with forklifts striking posts and employees’ safety
around forklifts were discussed during management safety meetings. Actual knowledge is established.
Further,
because the conditions were in plain view, CSA could have discovered the
conditions with reasonable diligence.
“Reasonable diligence” includes the employer’s “obligation to inspect
the work area, to anticipate hazards to which employees may be exposed, and to
take measures to prevent the occurrence.”
Frank Swidzinski Co., 9 BNA
OSHC 1230, 1233 (No. 76-4627, 1981). The
Commission has held that “[r]easonable steps to monitor compliance with safety
requirements are part of an effective safety program.” Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 19 BNA OSHC 1097, 1099 (No. 98-1748, 2000 (citations
omitted), aff’d without published opinion,
277 F.3d 1374 (5th Cir. 2001).
Constructive knowledge is established.
For the foregoing
reasons, the undersigned concludes the Secretary has met his burden of proving
that CSA failed to provide a clear view of the designated path of travel for
powered industrial trucks, exposing employees to crushing hazards while
materials are checked into the warehouse.
The Secretary has met his burden of proving the alleged violation in
this case. The violation is
affirmed.
Penalty
Determination
The Secretary proposed a
penalty of $6,300.00 in this case. The
Commission, in assessing an appropriate penalty, must give due consideration to
the gravity of the violation and to the size, history and good faith of the
employer. See section 17(j) of the Act.
The violation was classified as serious because injuries involving
permanent disability or death can be reasonably expected if struck by a
forklift (Tr. 197). The gravity of the
violation was determined to be of high severity with greater probability
because employees were working near a hazard that could produce a serious
physical injury or death if an accident occurred, and because the accident
resulted in a fatality (Tr. 197, 302-303).
In consideration of the
number of employees CSA employs, a 10 percent adjustment to the penalty was
applied, resulting in the proposed penalty of $6,300.00 (Tr. 303-304; Exh.
C-16). No adjustments were made for good
faith, due to the high severity and greater probability ratings, or for
history, as CSA had not been inspected within the past five years (Tr.
309-310). In consideration of the statutory penalty factors, the undersigned
finds the proposed penalty of $6,300.00 is appropriate.
FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The foregoing decision
constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Rule
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
ORDER
Based
upon the foregoing decision, it is ORDERED that:
Item 1 of Serious
Citation 1, alleging a violation of § 5(a)(1) of the Act, is affirmed, and a
penalty of $6,300.00 is assessed.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
Date:
November 19, 2013 SHARON
D. CALHOUN
Atlanta, Georgia Judge
[1] Section 5(a)(1)
of the Act requires that each employer “furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). To prove a violation of this provision, known
as the “general duty clause,” the Secretary must show that: (1) a condition or
activity in the workplace presented a hazard; (2) the employer or its industry
recognized the hazard; (3) the hazard was likely to cause death or serious
physical harm; and (4) a feasible means existed to eliminate or materially
reduce the hazard. Pegasus Tower,
21 BNA OSHC 1190, 1191, 2004-2009 CCH OSHD ¶ 32,861, p. 53,077 (No. 01-0547,
2005).
[2] The other three elements
the Secretary must establish to prove a violation of the Act’s general duty
clause are not in dispute. CSA
recognized that its employees were exposed to the hazard of being struck by a
forklift, and that the hazard was likely to cause death or serious physical
harm.
[3] The other two proposed (alternative) methods of abatement listed in the citation are: (1) the installation of mirrors on the forklift to allow an unobstructed view to the rear during backing; and (2) providing spotters to “safely marshal the forklifts to the rear so that a clear view of the path of travel can be maintained” and allow the operator to observe other traffic, personnel and safe clearances as prescribed by the “Safety Standard for Low Lift and High Lift Trucks” ANSI B56.1-2009, paragraph 5.3.6 (2007).
[4]
The job titles “checker” and
“clerk” will be used interchangeably in this decision. During the hearing, both terms were used to
refer to employees tasked with the duties of checking the steel coils, although
the job duties of the clerk appear to differ from those of the checker in that
clerks performed administrative tasks.